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This paper is aiming to elaborate the case of how exchange rate volatility (ERV), which is supposedly
considered to form optimum currency area (OCA), can be reduced in order justify the feasibility of the
OCA idea within ASEAN5 plus three. Interestingly, the results provide some evidences that the ASEAN5+3
are considered not really ready to form OCA. It corroborates the existing opinion that the different in
economic structure and its policies over foreign environment are becoming some barriers and challenging
area to synchronize in the following time. The positive impacts AS to ERV which are incurred in ASEAN5+3
economies indicate the existence of inappropriate condition to form OCA since there are no similar
shocks across a monetary union»s participating countries. Under such condition, it would foster the costs
of forgoing the exchange rate as a shock absorbing mechanism. It deserves to argue that those observed
countries still are resisting their existing regime since they are till believing that they begin to establish the
system of monetary which are able to absorb any possible shocks in regards of their SIZE. In sum, the
ASEAN5+3 countries are considered to fulfilling the requirement to form currency optimum area which
are able to main their stable currency.
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I. INTRODUCTION
After the introduction of Euro on eleven countries of Europe eleven years ago, and the
expanding trend of continuous Euro adoption by increasingly the influx numbers of countries.
Subsequently, there have been lots of study made on whether the replication of Euro experience
can be applied, particularly in ASEAN-5+3 area. This is especially crucial after the lesson of
1997/1998 Asian financial crises, where dollar dominant to be adopted as exchange rate regime
envisaged was not desirable for the pursuit of financial stability. Namable options alternative
come forward to counter this by exercising currency peg (either to a single currency or basket
of currency), flexible exchange rate regime, or monetary union. Numerous efforts have been
put in place, for example the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) which was announced by the ASEAN+3
finance ministers, convening in May 2000. The CMI were made to initially facilitate the exchange
of consistent, timely data and information, and to establish a regional financing arrangements.
The other approaches are taking place to strengthen the idea of integration is structuring The
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). Both of them are
basically pronounced to create a stable, prosperous, and competitive ASEAN economic region
in which free flow of goods, services, investment, and skilled labor through simultaneously
implementations progressive tariff cuts via the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT)
scheme.
However, the existence of regional integration needs macroeconomic coordination among
countries within region. Therefore, the purpose of regional integration is to promote greater
and foster the expansion works to synchronize business cycles, and finally to mitigate such
shocks by sharing the loss with a trading partner because both countries assuming hold claims
on each other»s output (Robert Mundel, 1973). The intensive coordination would affect in
reducing to some extent of macroeconomic volatility brought about by factors such as exchange
rate volatility (Frankel  and Wei, 1993). The European Union (EU) is considered as successful
model of economic integration, under which exchange rate uncertainty and misalignment is
avoided and trade and investment among members are promoted substantially (Ariccia, 1999).
The issue of integration could not far away from the emergence of exchange rate stability
(ERS) matter. In fact, ERS is seemly vital in any effort to ensure macroeconomic stability. Economic
theory suggests that misalignments in the real exchange rate of nations, as well as their departure
from long-run equilibrium rates, negatively affect economic growth. These conditions create
relative price uncertainty, trigger increased adjustment costs and decrease the efficiency of
resource allocation in domestic markets (Kemme & Teng, 2000). Hence, any effort to stabilize
exchange rates allows for the creation of a more conducive business environment and can
potentially increase economic growth rates.
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Given the importance of the above issues in promoting prosperity among ASEAN nations,
the question of how exchange rate volatility (ERV) can be reduced becomes vital. The regional
financial crisis in 1997 to 1998 eroded the credibility of unilateral fixed exchange rates, and
renewed calls for greater monetary integration and regional exchange rate stability in East Asia
(EA). The success of the Euro also raised interest in the viability of a common currency for both
ASEAN and the developed economies of East Asia (Zhang, Sato, & McAleer, 2004). This issue
was addressed extensively in the November 1999 ASEAN meeting, where the grouping»s 10
members were urged to work harder to achieve the target of a common market and a single
currency (Asia Now, November 29, 1999; Hurley & Santos, 2001).
However, a formal institutional framework appears to be lacking in the drive to achieve
monetary integration. In addition, economic and financial conditions differ greatly among the
ASEAN nations. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the economies in ASEAN have experienced
a rapid, seemingly spontaneous period of regional integration in the last decade. This integration
arose as a result of the unilateral liberalization of the goods and capital markets.
Despite the fact that quantifying the costs and benefits and applying the guidelines of an
optimum currency area (OCA) is difficult, the literature shows that ASEAN has several
characteristics that suggest that the benefits of implementing a common currency may be
significant, even relative to the costs (Madhur, 2002). Overall, the composite OCA indices for
the region are similar to those for the EU (Bayoumi & Eichengreen, 1998). These indices take
into account intraregional trade, wage-price flexibility, labor mobility, and shock symmetry. By
using a variety of such indicators from the OCA literature, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998)
conclude that, from a purely economic perspective, ASEAN is as suitable for an OCA as Europe
was prior to the Maastricht Treaty.
Table IV.1. Economic Growth And Depreciation
Around The 1997 Economic Crisis
Growth 1998 (%) Depreciation (%)
Source : IFS (2009)
Indonesia √1.4 85
Malaysia √6.5 45
Philippines √0.5 40
Singapore 1.5 20
Thailand √ 8.0 60
China +6 0
Japan -2 +8
South Korea -6.8 29
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During the post-Bretton Woods period, the ASEAN-5+3 nations experienced substantial
ERV despite adopting a crawling peg exchange rate regime. Between 1974 and 1999, the
Indonesian Rupiah was the most volatile of the ASEAN currencies, followed by the Philippine
Peso, while the Singapore Dollar was the least volatile (Hurley & Santos, 2001). However, in the
case of ASEAN5+3, China had experienced the least volatile countries since it has been
implementing the peg regime over US dollar. Other evidence documenting the volatility of
ASEAN currencies can be found in studies done by Nam and Mc Aleer (2002) and Lee and Tan
(2004). From Table IV.1, generally ASEAN currencies appear to be too volatile and sensitive to
sudden shocks. The order of volatility, however is in contrast to Hurley and Santos (2001).
Despite this difference, it is apparent that the two countries most affected by problems of
volatility, Thailand and Indonesia, also suffered the largest negative economic growth. China
was indicated as the least volatile of the ASEAN-5+3 states, and was least affected by the
economic crisis.
A popular view among economists and policy makers since the Asian crisis is that
developing countries with open capital accounts have a bipolar solution to the exchange rate
dilemma: either a free float or a hard peg. The hard peg solution refers specifically to the use of
a common currency or the formation of a monetary union. Hochreiter and Winckler (1995)
outlined the costs and benefits of giving up a national currency and joining a monetary union.
Among the effects described in relation to the Euro was a boost in economic growth that
occurred via increased trade (Rose, 2000; Frankel & Rose, 2002). Joining a monetary union also
facilitated greater microeconomic efficiency by eliminating ERV, hence lowering interest rates
and promoting international use of the currency.
Given relative stability of Singapore»s currency, we examine the bilateral exchange rate
between the four major ASEAN economies plus three, namely Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines
and Indonesia, the Singapore Dollar, China, South Korea, and Japan. It is our intention in this
paper to first find an explanation for the volatility in the exchange rate, and thus determine the
feasibility of a single currency in ASEAN-5+3 region. By definition, if the OCA variables shown
in this study significantly explain the variation in exchange rate, the ASEAN-5+3 common currency
would be deemed viable and likely strengthen the argument for the AFTA. It is also our intention
to examine if there is reverse (Granger) causality in the relationship; in other words, whether
ERV had an impact on OCA criteria. Should the empirical model validate the formation of an
OCA in ASEAN-5+3, our final motivation would be to identify the difficulties that ASEAN-5+3
nations have to face even before they start on the road towards a common currency.
The paper is organized as follows. The second section that follows presents a review of
the existing literature, and includes definitions of the OCA variables. The third section specifies
191Implementation of Optimum Currency Area Criteria and Its Volatility: Case Study ASEAN-5+3
the empirical model along with its estimation procedures. This is followed by an empirical
assessment of the model with the results being interpreted in the forth section. In addition,
section fourth as part of the answer for the third objective, we raise the possible difficulty faced
by ASEAN-5+3 in successfully forming a common currency and thus become the agenda for
ASEAN-5+3 to work through before the aim of forming it can be realized. The paper concludes
in section five by proposing some of safeguards and strategies that envisaged as keys to the
success of the forming OCA.
II. THEORY
Seminal contribution by Mundell (1961) and McKinnon (1963) had risen to the theory of
optimum currency area (OCA) as well as monetary and exchange rate cooperation among
countries. Mundell (1963) had pointed out that countries which have symmetrically affected by
shocks are the prime candidate and appropriate for an OCA. Subsequently, Mundell and Mc
Kinnon through their research, found at least four benefits would impinge of adopting a common
currency, namely :
1. Extent of trade happens if potential members of a union trade a lot with each other since its
existence is expected would reduce transaction costs.
2. Nature of disturbances happens if the countries experience similar shocks so that the cost of
giving up monetary policy independence would decrease.
3. Degree of labor mobility happens if high labor mobility across borders can be a useful
mechanism for adjusting to asymmetric shocks that subsequently lead to high unemployment
in a subset of the members of the union.
4. Fiscal transfer happens if region-specific shocks prevail, a federal fiscal system would provide
regional insurance ( in the form of federally funded unemployment insurance benefits),
thereby attenuating the impact of regional shocks on interregional income differential
5. Entering an OCA also imposes a ≈discipline∆ on individual countries as it frees the central
banks from the urge to embark on inflationary policies.
6. Reducing any speculative attacks as countries are reinforced and also deterred from pursuing
uncoordinated economic policies like ≈beggar thy neighbor∆, which any violations in
conducting a such policy would render a negative impact on all the countries.
Frankel and Rose (1998) mooted the idea that some of the OCA criteria discussed can be
endogenous. Once a group of countries establish a currency area by permanently fixing their
exchange rate, the degree of intra-area economic integration will increase along with the degree
of symmetric of economic shock. Hence deeper economic integration and symmetric of shocks
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are not the prerequisite of establishing a common currency area or other degree of monetary
cooperation. Instead, if these countries exhibit a strong political commitment to coordinate
monetary and exchange rate policies, then their attempt to form a currency area can be successful
as long as they satisfy the OCA criteria to some extent initially
Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1999) try to analyze the economic and political prospects for
monetary integration in East Asia, and according to particular criteria, namely the high level of
trade and FDI integration, speed of adjustment to shock and symmetric supply and demand
disturbances, come up with the conclusion that the region satisfies the standard OCA criteria
for the adoption of a common monetary policy. However, a major deterrent to this process is
the issue of sacrificing monetary autonomy especially given the weak financial system in a
number of these countries.
Looking at the evolving trade pattern in Asia, Kawai and Motonishi (2005) find that in
the last decade there has been a rapid expansion of intra-regional trade as well as intra-industry
trade. Moreover, intra-regional trade as a share of total trade in East Asia has risen from 35%
in 1980 to 54% in 2003. In terms of FDI integration, Japan, United States and EU are considered
equally important for foreign investors in East Asia, with Japan being the most significant in
ASEAN region.
In terms of degree of labor market integration seems to vary across the countries of the
region. Developed economies such as Japan and Korea have maintained tight restriction on
labor mobility. Meanwhile, Southeast Asian economies such as Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore,
and Indonesia are categorized by much greater labor mobility. Both Eichengreen and Bayoumi
(1999) and Goto and Hamada (1994) note that labor markets are more flexible in Asia that
they were in Europe in Early 1990s.
According to Mundell seminal paper which were stated that the system of national
currencies connected by the existence of flexible exchange rate. Subsequently, he came up
with the idea that the need of establishing a system of currencies where currencies are not
defined by national border, but by geographic areas within which factor mobility is high. Mundell,
later on, argue that the choice between fixed and flexible exchange rate regime should not be
independent of the economic characteristics of the countries or areas in question (Tower and
Willett, 1976).
Based on OCA theory, the wisdom of joining a monetary union can be decided using
three major factors. These are the extent of trade intensity between the countries in the proposed
area, the symmetry of economy activity and country-specific characteristic (Ling, 2001). Mckinnon
(1963) stated that highly open economies are recommended in satisfying for OCA as a common
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currency is very important for their stability and prosperity. This paper would concern in analyzing
the existence of asymmetric shocks and country»s GDP as proxy to meet the criteria of establishing
OCA.
Asymmetric shocks are another important element of OCA theory, as they tend to
undermine the case for common currency. According to Frankel & Mussa (1980), asymmetric
shocks occur when an unexpected disturbance affects one country»s national output differently
from another. The OCA literature stresses that similar shocks across a monetary union»s
participating countries are likely to reduce the cost of forgoing the exchange rate as a shock
absorbing mechanism. On the other hand, the retention of the exchange rate as an independent
policy instrument is crucial if a country face mainly asymmetric shocks (Ling, 2001). The
diminution of autonomy as an impact of the loss of an independent monetary policy in
implementation of OCA would be envisaged more costly when : (1) macroeconomic shocks are
more ≈asymmetric∆, (2) monetary policy is a powerful instrument for offsetting such shocks,
and (c) other adjustment mechanism, such as relative wages and labor mobility, are less effective
(Eichengreen, 1997).
In the face of these concerns, Mundell suggested that a common currency is able to
mitigate asymmetric shock because it involves a pooling of the members» reserves and a
more diverse investment portfolio. In a monetary union, a country that suffers from an
adverse shock effectively ≈shares∆ the loss with its trading partners, because the partner
hold a claim on each other»s output through the common currency. Under a flexible exchange
rate however, no such portfolio diversification exists and a country facing an adverse shock
may suffer devaluation. The domestic currency and its assets would buy less on world
markets and the cost of the shock would be confined largely to the country within which
the shock originated. In short, we hypothesize that there is a positive association between
asymmetric shock and ERV.
Existing OCA theories are primarily related to the choice of exchange rate regime. They
also tend to focus on country-specific variables that do not change very much over time. Devereux
and Lane (2003) proposed the use of relative size of the gross domestic products (GDPs) of two
countries as a proxy for size. Size, measured as the log of the product of the GDPs of countries
i and j, can be considered a proxy for the microeconomic benefits of exchange rate stability. In
other word, smaller countries are expected to be less willing to tolerate fluctuations in their
nominal exchange rate. Hence, we expect a positive relationship between ERV and a country»s
GDP.
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III. METHODOLOGY
As abovementioned that the present study is likely to investigate the relationship between
ERV and OCA variables, i.e. asymmetric shocks, and size. Our purpose is to justify the feasibility
of the OCA idea within ASEAN5+3. Our empirical model is specified as follows :
ERVt = βo + β1OCAt + µt
Where, ERC constitutes as the nominal exchange rate volatility and OCA is the optimum currency
area. Substituting the proxy for OCA, we may get :
ERVt = βo + βo11ASt + βo ln SIZEt + µt
AS represents as asymmetric shocks, and a positive relationship is expected between this
factor and ERV. The higher the level of the AS between two countries, the more profound is the
more-adversely affected country»s desire to have a flexible adjustment mechanism or flexible
exchange rate to absorb and mitigate the impact of the shocks. Meanwhile, size indicates the
interaction between core country»s GDP and that of corresponding ASEAN5+3 countries. As
mentioned in Devereux and Lane (2003), this variable is a proxy for country-specific characteristics
and captures the notion that the smaller country will not be able to tolerate variations in the
exchange rate. Hence, we expect the sign to be positive.
ERV is measured as a moving average of first-differenced nominal exchange rate, with an
order of three (m = 3), as follows:
ERV
t 
 = [(   ) Σ1m mi =1 ER      - ERt-1-i t-1 ]
AS
t 
 = [(                  )  ]growth  - growth
 k,t
2    2
 j,t
The measurement of AS is quite similar to the measurement of ERV. AS is proxied by an
absolute growth differential value, or:
where the subscripts k and j stand for country k and j, respectively.
Many forms of economic time series data exhibit common features such as periods of
stationarity. However, it is only recently that time series econometricians have formalized the
concept of common co-movements at particular frequencies in econometric models, together
with the idea that common factors may influence the trend component of some macroeconomic
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variables. Nevertheless, the statistical underpinnings of time series analysis require that the
data be stationary. This will require a first-difference for most macroeconomic series before
estimating the economic model. Hence, the significance of detecting and rectifying the trend
component in macroeconomic data is sufficiently indicated.
If two or more variables have a common trend, then causality must exist in at least one
direction. Many series, even those which are non-stationary, when examined separately, will
display a long-term equilibrium relationship if they are joined linearly (Engle & Granger, 1987).
Hence, both series are said to be cointegrated. Cointegration tests are concerned with the
long-term behavior of the components of partially non-stationary time series elements √ this is
an indication of a common trend component. In other words, cointegration is the statistical
approach that tests for the existence of a long-run equilibrium relationship among non-stationary
variables integrated in the same order. Two non-stationary series are said to be integrated if
there exists a linear combination of the two series. For this purpose, Johansen and Juselius
(1990) have introduced two likelihood ratio tests to determine the number of cointegrating
vectors, namely the maximum eigenvalue and trace tests.
However, given the endogenous nature of OCA variables, it is also very important to
analyze the dynamic short run relationship among the variables in the study. The cointegration
between two or more variables is sufficient to indicate causality in at least one direction (Granger,
1988). The causality between predetermined and dependent variables can be examined by
conducting the Wald test, that is, by calculating the F-statistic based on the null hypothesis that
a set of coefficients on the lagged values of independent variables are equal to zero. If the null
hypothesis is accepted, it can be concluded that the independent variables do not cause the
dependent variable.
The long run relationship between ERV and OCA variables is tested using cointegration
procedures. Seven types of exchange rates were chosen, namely Yuan/SD, Yen/SD, Won/SD,
RM/SD, Bath/SD, Peso/SD, and Rp/SD, where SD stands for Singapore Dollar. These rates were
tracked over the 1970 to 2008 period, along with data each country»s GDP by using data collected
in International Financial Statistic, a publication of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
IV. RESULT AND ANALYSIS
Using unit root test of Philip-Perron (1988), It appears, in general, that all variables are
non stationary at level in each country. the use of the error vector correction procedure is
appropriate,  given the evidence that generally all variables are seemly integrated of order of
I or I(I). Table IV.2 provides the results of the cointegration test, shown by the significant of
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trace and maximum eigenvalue tests. From the results of the Johansen cointegration test, the
null hypothesis of no-cointegration is rejected at the 0.01 significance level for 2 countries,
namely Thailand Bath and Peso Phillipines. The remaining are seemly not likely to show no
cointegration so that those considered are not having a long run equilibrium. A summary of
the overall result is presented in Table IV.2.
The estimated error correction model (ECM) for each equation is presented in Panel I of
Table IV.3. This provides further evidence that there exists a long-run equilibrium among variables.
The ECT reflects the adjustment process on the path towards this long-run equilibrium. From
Panel II in Table IV.4, it is apparent that the standard error of regression for each model is
generally low. The robustness of the model is affirmed by diagnostic tests, including the LM
test (Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation test), the ARCH test (heterogeneity test), the Jacque-
Bera test (normality test) and the CUSUM test (stability test) under 1% critical value. From the
ECM, it appears that the lagged period of the error correction term (ECT) in each equation
enters significantly with a correct sign and magnitude. However, according to the results, we
could explain that not all countries within the region which are showing a correct sign and
magnitude as expected in earlier hypothesis. Bath Thailand, Peso Phillipinnes, Ringgit Malaysia,
Won South Korea, and Yen Japan seem to appear as insignificant sign since their»s GDP and
existing asymmetric shocks across and over the countries. Therefore, this provide some evidence
that the ASEAN5+3 are considered not really ready to form OCA. It corroborates the existing
opinion that the different in economic structure and its policies over foreign environment are
becoming some barriers and challenging area to synchronize in the following time.
Turning to the impact of AS, it appears that its contribution to volatility is relatively
high, since the newly industrialization countries, such as China and South Korea are starting
to foster and expand their»s economic size and scope to more competitive. The intensity of
trade of those countries has added up the possibility of asymmetric shocks across countries
within the region. The equations also outline that Malaysia»s, Indonesia»s, Japan»s, South Korea»s,
and China»s economic performance are becoming similar to that of Singapore»s, is that in
terms of unexpected disturbance affects one country»s national output differently from another
(Frankel and Mussa, 1980). This development may be explained by the similarities in the
production structure of ASEAN economies, as well as by the parallel movement towards
greater openness, for example, in the form of a more export-focused orientation and the
liberalization of capital accounts. Similarly, the contribution of AS to ERV is relatively low for
Thailand and Phillipinnes. Therefore, in general, the level of AS suffered by the ASEAN5+3
economies is not very high. What exists instead is a high degree of shock symmetry (Madhur,
2002). In short, the significant and positive impact of AS on ERV suggests the existence of
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Table IV.2
ECM Model And Its Diagnostic Test
PANEL I : ECM MODEL
D(ERV)BS = 0.07968894027*( ERV(-1) - 0.03811963099*GDP(-1) - 0.004464539619*AS(-1) +
0.05841237222 ) + 0.7547382605*D(ERV(-1)) + 0.01428315065*D(GDP(-1)) +
4.617901834e-05*D(AS(-1)) + 0.0001200149846
D(ERV)PS = 0.03871754057*( ERV(-1) - 0.05262315102*GDP(-1) - 0.007045897971*AS(-1) -
0.110231822 ) + 0.7572955332*D(ERV(-1)) + 0.01735784436*D(GDP(-1)) -
6.765507364e-05*D(AS(-1)) + 3.278425301e-05
D(ERV)RS = - 0.002444896479*( ERV(-1) + 0.4449241465*AS(-1) - 1.024876653*GDP(-1) +
1.391315639 ) - 0.03867840317*D(ERV(-1)) + 0.6587205498*D(ERV(-2)) +
0.0009739571891*D(AS(-1)) + 4.556830545e-06*D(AS(-2)) + 0.0384236329*D(GDP(-1)) -
0.04292235592*D(GDP(-2)) - 0.002233502854
D(ERV)RsS = - 0.006440788991*( ERV(-1) + 0.001809625807*AS(-1) - 0.0004454966862*GDP(-1) +
0.3457259378 ) + 0.5775751067*D(ERV(-1)) + 2.131529969e-06*D(AS(-1)) +
0.0005838300632*D(GDP(-1)) - 1.554889872e-05
D(ERV)WS = - 0.1518540344*( ERV(-1) - 0.001389074651*GDP(-1) + 1.417262268e-05*AS(-1) +
0.3251849436 ) - 0.3481845398*D(ERV(-1)) + 0.0003733364994*D(GDP(-1)) +
1.623566172e-06*D(AS(-1)) - 9.640797512e-05
D(ERV)YeS =  - 0.003021766596*( ERV(-1) + 0.008675900519*GDP(-1) + 0.01341799056*AS(-1) +
0.3312831701 ) + 0.8014657752*D(ERV(-1)) - 1.053775292*D(ERV(-2)) +
0.003276657145*D(GDP(-1)) + 0.001065110035*D(GDP(-2)) - 1.375997146e-05*D(AS(-1)) +
8.735769183e-06*D(AS(-2)) + 0.0002205816598
D(ERV)YS = - 0.0253726762*( ERV(-1) - 0.04092951236*AS(-1) + 0.173931606*GDP(-1) +
0.629455274 ) + 0.6689452318*D(ERV(-1)) - 0.2411002694*D(ERV(-2)) -
0.001104137039*D(AS(-1)) - 0.0002436604594*D(AS(-2)) - 0.02355093915*D(GDP(-1)) -
0.04310754547*D(GDP(-2)) - 0.008059261714
Panel II : Model Criteria and Diagnostic Tests
BS      PS       RS  RsS      WS YeS YS
R2 0.8694 0.8938 0.8995 0.5107 0.3409 0.3317 0.612656
S.E. of regression 0.004105 0.016309 0.024829 0.000599 0.000587 0.000754 0.103822
Autocorrelation 69.46961 (0.000) 35.20948 (0.000) 30.72313 (0.00000) 49.09658
(0.00000) 37.80389 (0.0000) 139.4289 (0.00000) 93.06854 (0.00000)
Heterogeneity 38.94341 (0.000009) 99.01281 (0.0000) 4.894151 (0.033379) 290.3209
(0.00000) 47.84354 (0.00000) 21.22666 (0.00005) 100.4101 (0.0000)
Normality 0.899722 (0.637717) 1.3333434 (0.513391) 2.527106 (0.282648) 14.92102
(0.000575) 13.35481 (0.001259) 2.195206 (0.333670) 1.061882 (0.588051)
Notes : Figure in ( ) p-value and the test is based on F-Test
BS =Bath/SD,PS = Peso/SD, RS = Ringgit/SD, RsS = Rupiah/SD, WS = Won/SD, YeS = Yen/SD, YS = Yuan/SD, SD = Singapore Dollar
***,**,* are McKinnon 99%,95%, and 90% critical values, respectively
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slight differences between Singapore and its ASEAN5+3 economies. This observation also implies
the need for adjustments when the economic condition of a trading partner changes
unexpectedly. Therefore, we may conclude that ASEAN5+3 countries are not appropriate to
form a monetary union which are under the concept of optimum currency area in regards with
asymmetric shocks emerge. Similarly, the results have indicated the fact that the possibility of
the occurrence in asymmetric shocks imply any fluctuations in currencies»s stability in other
countries within the region. Hence, the positive impacts AS to ERV which are incurred in
ASEAN5+3 economies indicate the existence of inappropriate condition to form OCA since
there are no similar shocks across a monetary union»s participating countries. Under such
condition, it would foster the costs of forgoing the exchange rate as a shock absorbing
mechanism.
Table IV.3
Long Term  Equation
1. Bath/SD
ERV = -0.038120*** GDP √ 0.004465*** AS
(0.00418) (0.00058)
<-9.11938> <-7.66664>
2. Peso/SD
ERV = -0.052623*** GDP √ 0.007046*** AS
(0.01039) (0.00107)
<-5.06678> <-6.55751>
3. RM/SD
ERV = -1.024877** GDP + 0.444924* AS
(0.10598) (0.29340)
<4.19811> <-3.49312>
4. RsS/SD
ERV = -0.001866* GDP + 0.000670*** AS
(0.00011) (0.00087)
<-2.14001> <5.98445>
5. Won/SD
ERV = -0.001389** GDP + 0.0000142 AS
(0.00041) (0.000014)
<-3.41180> <1.01662>
6. YeS/SD
ERV = 0.008676 GDP + 0.013418*** AS
(0.00993) (0.00264)
<0.87356> <5.09110>
7. Yuan/SD
ERV = -0.040930** AS + 0.173932 GDP
(0.01278) (0.15408)
<-3.20257> <1.12885>
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In all cases, SIZE plays only a minor role in explaining real ERV. Its effects appear to be in
correct signs and magnitude as expected earlier in all observed countries except in the case of
the Yen in relation to the SD. The equations show small results and the SIZE element remains
negative. It implies that the economies are big enough to absorb any shocks. Given the relatively
small value of their coefficients, we can say that there is a growing trend for ASEAN5+3
economies to develop their own capability in handling the shocks as well as a tendency to have
and implement stable exchange rate regime. In other words, the ASEAN5+3 countries are
attempting to maintain their regime of currency. It deserves to argue that those observed
countries still are resisting their existing regime since they are till believing that they begin to
establish the system of monetary which are able to absorb any possible shocks in regards of
their SIZE. In sum, the ASEAN5+3 countries are considered to fulfilling the requirement to form
currency optimum area which are able to main their stable currency.
The results of the short-run Granger causality tests are presented in Table IV.6. Short-run
Granger causality appears to run mainly from the ERV to each of the OCA criterion, although
the short-run impact on GDP and AS is almost insignificant in the case ASEAN5 countries and
significant at critical point in the case of China Yuan, Taiwan Won, and Yen Japan. Meanwhile,
the short-run Granger causality running from each of the OCA criterion to ERV or other OCA
criterion is less apparent. Therefore, the disequilibrium in the short-run may be due to the
shock of the ERV.
We attempted to examine the severity of the ERV impact on real economic activities
more closely. Focusing on the second column of Table IV.4, the short-run Granger causality
from ERV into each of the OCA criterion becomes clear. The sign in the bracket stands for the
direction of the impact of the ERV on each of OCA criterion. Although many studies that utilize
the VAR model (i.e. VECM) investigate the direction of impact by using impulse response functions
(IRFs), we chose not to focus on the IRFs and instead simply sum up the coefficients of the
short-run impact of the ERV. This method of quantifying the short run effect by summing up
the coefficients is commonly carried out as part of ARDL procedures. When there is more than
one lag of the VAR model, the short-run coefficient (or impact) is estimated by the summation
of first-differenced ERV coefficient, while the significance of the impact is tested by an F-test
based on Wald-test procedure.
According to Granger test, we found that only Thailand, Taiwan, Japan, and China
which are delivering the short run effects to observed variables. While the short-run impacts
of ERV on GDP and AS are positive for those following countries. Meanwhile in the case of
Thailand, GDP has caused over the existence to AS. It constitutes the fact that the Thailand
economy would be suffered a shock through the fluctuation in it»s GDP. Subsequently, Indonesia,
200 Bulletin of Monetary, Economics and Banking, October 2010
Malaysia, and Phillipinnes seem not to show any causal relationship between variables OCA
and ERV.
Basically, ERV, which is used as a proxy for miscoordination, can contribute to greater
divergence, instead of convergence, among ASEAN members. In short, we found that ERV has
in general contributed negatively to the level of real economic activity.  Both generally and
empirically, we found that all OCA variables play an important role in explaining the ERV, and
Table IV.4. GRANGER CAUSALITY BASED ON VECM
ERV AS GDP
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
ERV 1.31844 (0.25866) 0.82326 (0.37043)
AS 1.89555 (0.17732) 0.45759 (0.50320)
GDP 0.01467 (0.90429) 2.08815 (0.15734)
PANEL I : BATH/SD
ERV 1.72914 (0.19707) 0.89886 (0.34959)
AS 0.04836 (0.82722) 0.29189 (0.59243)
GDP 0.29700 (0.58923) 3.15227* (0.08452)
PANEL II : PESO/SD
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
ERV 0.09429 (0.76061) 1.77070 (0.19190)
AS 0.13783 (0.71268) 0.89416 (0.35084)
GDP 0.51223 (0.47892) 1.94263 (0.17217)
PANEL III : RM/SD
ERV 0.03771 (0.84716) 0.06164 (0.80567)
AS 0.84635 (0.36388) 0.52356 (0.47414)
GDP 0.31780 (0.57653) 0.06873 (0.79474)
PANEL IV : RP/SD
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
PANEL V : WON/SD
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
ERV 5.77327** (0.02171) 4.23840** (0.04702)
AS 0.01909 (0.89090) 0.83545 (0.36696)
GDP 1.52615 (0.22492) 0.00565 (0.94050)
Notes : Figure in ( ) p-value and the test is based on F-Test. SD = Singapore Dollar
***,**,* are McKinnon 99%,95%, and 90% critical values, respectively
PANEL VI : YEN/SD
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
ERV 3.78689* (0.05972) 8.88667*** (0.00520)
AS 4.44807** (0.04217) 1.00145 (0.32383)
GDP 0.39843 (0.53200) 0.08091 (0.77774)
PANEL VII : YUAN/SD
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
ERV 0.07575 (0.78475) 3.54110* (0.06820)
AS 6.24871** (0.01727) 1.96944 (0.16932)
GDP 7.03221** (0.01195) 0.20367 (0.65456)
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thus in the choice of an exchange rate regime. The question then arises as to why the idea of
a common or single currency has not been even remotely realized. From the empirical results,
possible explanations include smallness, coordination, the choice of currency, as well as labor
immobility.
As mentioned earlier that OCA is a geographical region in which it would maximize
economic efficiency to have the entire region share a single currency. It describes the optimal
characteristic for the merger of currencies or the creation of a new currency. The theory is
utilized often to argue whether or not a certain region is ready to become a monetary union,
one of the final stages in economic integration. In this sense, the successful of establishing of
OCA in the area of ASEAN5+3 countries.
A successful move towards an OCA basically need to overcome a number of obstacles
that are usually associated with greater economic and monetary integration. We may have
taken a close look at some of these constraints in order to mitigate the barriers and keep a right
track in forming OCA agenda.
1. CMI Framework: Weak Institution?
In any kind of a formal exchange rate arrangement within a region there is need for a
mechanism providing some degree of collective defence against speculative attacks on a single
currency. The recently developed Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) can provide some institutional
support against such speculative attacks. Following deliberations in Chiang Mai in May 2000,
Japan, China and South Korea signed bilateral agreements with the original five ASEAN member
countries establishing a network of bilateral swap agreements (BSAs) aiming at greater monetary
cooperation. The network enabled participating countries to draw from their respective BSAs
for a period of 90 days. The first drawing could be renewed seven times. The interest rate
applicable to the drawing is the LIBOR plus a premium of 150 basis points for the first drawing
and the first renewal. Thereafter, the premium increases by 50 basis points for every two renewals,
within an overall ceiling of 300 basis points. The currency swaps amounted to over $83 billion
in July 2007. To mitigate the problem of moral hazard, these BSA swaps are linked with IMF
disbursements. A country can borrow only up to 20% if it is not under an IMF programme.
Apart from benefits arising from nominal swaps, the BSAs signal political and economic
support in the event of a financial distress. If the ACU (Asian Currency Unit) is to become a
viable parallel currency, the Chiang Mai Initiative has to play a very important role. Unfortunately,
the current structure of the CMI has several shortcomings that can reduce it»s effectiveness. In
it»s present form CMI is primarily bilateral in nature. The use of BSAs requires approval from
202 Bulletin of Monetary, Economics and Banking, October 2010
each lender. Under such circumstances, if a number of members refuse to provide swaps or
various swap providers demand different terms and conditions, the CMI looses it»s effectiveness
as a lender of last resort. Moreover, discussion with various swap providers is time consuming
and deprives swap requesting countries of the ability to mount an effective and prompt
defence against speculative attacks. Thus steps should be taken to multilateralize the existing
bilateral swap arrangements so that swap disbursements are made in a concerted and timely
manner.
The BSA facility is only a small step towards financial cooperation in the region. The
current size of the swap facility has only marginally increased the financial resources available
to countries for helping them to meet their liquidity needs, and is inadequate to prevent a
financial crisis of the kind witnessed in 1997. Moreover, only 20% of the BSA facility is
immediately available to the borrowers while the remaining 80% requires IMF approval and
hence is subject to IMF conditionalities. Such linkages preserve the hegemony of the U.S. in the
regional financial framework, something that the Asian countries are keen on breaking.
CMI»s current structure also ensures that participating countries do not feel an urgent
need to establish a central agency for conducting regional surveillance. The absence of a central
body to manage the resources and monitor the financial developments in the region is a serious
impediment to the evolution of a joint decision making process. Recognizing these shortcomings,
the ASEAN+3 ministers agreed to take steps to enhance the effectiveness of the CMI. These
include further integration and enhancement of ASEAN+3 economic surveillance into the CMI
framework, clear definition of the swap activation process and the adoption of a collective
decision-making mechanism, increase in the size of swaps, and improvement of the drawdown
mechanism.
2. Inadequate Surveillance in the Region
Effective regional surveillance of national policies is a prerequisite for countries attempting
to adopt a singular currency or undertaking looser forms of monetary cooperation. One of the
primary reasons for linking the BSA»s activation to the IMF is due to the availability of a credible
surveillance mechanism with the Fund for member countries. During the fallout of the Asian
crisis, the need for some sort of an Asian surveillance mechanism was recognized and it»s
objective was to devise an early warning system to prevent similar crises in the future as well as
limit the impact of cross country contagion during the fallout of the Asian crisis.
The ASEAN-5+3 countries have an existing system of surveillance process with technical
assistance from the Regional Economic Monitoring Unit (REMU) of the ADB called the ASEAN+3
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Economic Policy Review and Dialogue Process. The process includes the preparation of a
confidential staff report by the ADB, which is reviewed by the policymakers of the member
countries. The report is thereafter discussed at a finance ministers» meeting and is brought out
as an agreed ministerial statement.
The inherent structure of the entire review and surveillance process reveals several glaring
inadequacies. Firstly, since the staff knows that the final document is going to be vetted by the
various ministers, it is likely to be largely inoffensive in nature and unlikely to underpin countries
following policies that could be destabilizing for the region. Such a document, as evident from
the recent ministers» statements, is unlikely to encourage discussions about the incipient risks
in the region Moreover, unlike the IMF surveillance, the ASEAN-5+3 process does not specify
the precise content of the information each government needs to provide. Consequently, the
information available to the various members is at the discretion of the reporting country. This
makes it very difficult to draw comparisons among the various countries and provide policy
related conclusions.
This lack of independent and credible surveillance to monitor economic and financial
developments in the region is a significant obstacle to greater economic and monetary
integration. This is, of course, not to suggest that the Fund»s surveillance mechanisms, essentially
in the form of Article IV consultations, are decidedly superior. However, compared with the
perceived lack of teeth in the ASEAN-5+3 surveillance mechanism, there are probably important
lessons to be learnt from the more upgraded system of the Fund.
3. Underdeveloped Bond Market
A deep and well developed bond market facilitating orderly cross country flows of debt
within the region is an important prerequisite for the ACU. To that extent the initiative of
setting up the Asian Bond Fund (ABF) was definitely a step in the right direction as it enabled
the bringing together of Asian economies with different sizes and economic structures. The
eleven members of the Executives» Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central Bank (EMEAP) agreed
in 2003 to establish the ABF, a regional investment fund investing in bonds denominated in
U.S. dollars. The initial corpus was $1 billion with the various governments voluntarily contributing
about 1% of their reserves. The Fund was supposed to invest in bonds issued by the public
sectors of eight countries, the developed countries of Australia, New Zealand and Japan only
being lenders to the ABF.
With different countries in the region exhibit varying degrees of current account deficits
and surpluses, development of a strong bond market would have enabled useful absorption of
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intra-regional debt flows. However, the initial form of the ABF had severe limitations that required
to be resolved for ensuring greater financial cooperation. Firstly, the ABF could invest mainly in
dollar denominated securities and was unable to resolve an insolvency crisis of an Asian bond
issuer in cases involving a sharp declines in the values of the Asian currencies vis-´a-vis the U.S.
dollar like the kind experienced by Thailand and Korea during the 1997 financial crisis. Thus
there was a critical problem of «currency mismatch». Secondly, majority of the bond issuers
belong to the private sector, and they tend to use the funds for long-term investments while
foreign lenders are mostly of the short-term variety. When business conditions or expectations
worsen, foreign lenders are likely to reduce their risk exposure by withdrawing funds, plunging
local business into insolvency. Thus apart from currency mismatch, the Asian Bond Fund also
suffered from «maturity mismatch». This «double mismatch» was one of the main reasons for the
Asian financial crisis in 1997.
Recognizing the threat of «currency mismatch» and with the objective of promoting
local currency denominated bonds, the ABF-2 was introduced in December 2004. This involved
purchases of $2 billion of Asian-currency denominated sovereign and quasi sovereign bonds.
ABF-2 also introduced a Pan-Asian Bond Index Fund (PAIF) and a Fund of Bonds Fund (FBF).
PAIF is a single bond fund index investing in local currency bonds issued by eight countries.
On the other hand, the FBF is made up of two tiers. The parent fund is further divided into
eight sub funds, each of which invests in the local currency bonds issued in their respective
markets.
Size again is a major weakness of this initiative. The current size of $2 billion is insignificant
compared to the reserve holdings or the infrastructural financing requirements of most of
these countries. Second, the Fund covers only eight Asian economies excluding some ASEAN
members as well as other significant economies like India. Thus there is tremendous scope for
improving both the coverage and the size of the regional debt market. Moreover, owing to the
limited supply of good quality sovereign and quasi-sovereign bonds, initiatives like the ABF can
actually crowd out private bond purchases leading to no new net financing.
4. Diverse Exchange Rate Regimes
The European experience indicates that the presence of a common monetary regime, i.e.
pursuit of region wide exchange rate stability, played a key role in evolution of greater monetary
cooperation. However, Asian countries follow a diverse range of exchange rate regimes. While
a number of the Asian currencies including Indian Rupee, Singapore Dollar, Thai Baht, and
Malaysian Ringitt can be classified as managed floats, other countries are following different
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exchange rate mechanisms. Brunei Dollar and Chinese Renminbi continue to be pegged mainly
to Singapore Dollar and U.S. Dollar respectively. On the other hand, Japanese Yen, Korean
Won, Indonesian Rupiah and Philippine Peso are freely floating.
Such diverse exchange rate arrangements in the Asian region reflect the different objectives
followed by the monetary policymaker. These range from fixing the exchange rate with another
country in a currency board system to import the latter»s monetary policy, to keeping the exchange
rate undervalued to promote export led growth, and explicit inflation targeting. Reconciling
such diverse objectives within the region is bound to be a challenging task.
5. Economic, Historical and Political Heterogeneity
While arguing for greater economic integration in Asia, it is important to keep an eye on
the political, economic and historical differences between the countries in the region. Asian
countries differ widely in terms of economic structure and level of development. Divergence in
per capita GDP between the former is much higher than that in Europe or North America. In
2006, Japan and Singapore»s per capita GDP in PPP terms was nearly 15 times that of Lao PDR.
Similarly, share of exports in GDP range from below 15% in Japan to well over 100% in Malaysia
and Singapore. Several countries like China and the newer ASEAN members have extensively
regulated financial systems and are unlikely to release operational control in the near future.
Moreover, while in Europe, Germany took the lead role in pushing towards monetary
integration, there is an absence of a clear leader in the Asian region. Japan is the most developed
country in the region but has unsettled historical issues with neighbouring countries like China
and Korea. Thus any bloc with Japan as the sole center is unlikely to find many takers in Asia.
China, owing to it»s size and an impressive growth over the last 25 years, can be another
potential centre. However, it»s relatively underdeveloped financial architecture, inconvertible
currency, and a central bank with limited autonomy can be major impediments to any such
claims. Moreover, China also has it»s share of unresolved issues with Korea and India. Also it is
likely to face competition from India, another big and rapidly growing economy of the region,
in it»s pursuit to emerge as the core of a regional currency arrangement.
The absence of a central country till now means that Asian cooperation needs to rely
more on a symmetric approach. Such cooperation requires a strong region wide political
commitment. The vast heterogeneity among countries, however, impedes the fostering of
political will. The Asian countries have wide differences in social structures, and economic
systems, ranging from mature market economies like Japan and Korea to economies in transition
like China, India and Vietnam. Although, in recent years countries have cooperated in areas of
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security and strategic interests, residual Cold War attitudes might still constrain greater economic
and monetary cooperation. One of the key issues in this regard is the strategic relationships
that many countries in the region have with the US, which might create an ambiguity in pursuing
Asian regionalism. There exists doubts over whether regionalism would provide greater benefits
than multilateralism in the region. Such arguments have influenced several countries in Asia
and discouraged the build up of the political consensus needed for closer cooperation. The
process has become more difficult due to the wide divergence in political systems and institutions
in the region (eg. non-democratic governments in China and Myanmar and mature democracies
in India, Japan and Korea)
V. STRATEGIES
A successful move towards an Asian Currency Unit needs to overcome the above obstacles.
Thus the move needs to be supported by two sets of factors. Firstly, certain institutional safeguards
have to be created or the existing ones strengthened, for preventing the participating countries
from breaking away from such an arrangement. Secondly, strategies need to be devised for
promoting the use and acceptability of this parallel currency. We list below some of the safeguards
and strategies that in our opinion are key to the success of the ACU.
V.1. Periodic Review of the Asian Currency Unit (ACU)
Given the extent of dynamism in most of the Asian economies, it is very important to
periodically review the composition of the ACU for ensuring that it reflects current economic
realities. The amount of each component currency will remain fixed while it»s contribution to
the ACU will vary with the exchange rate. As currencies appreciate (depreciate), there will be
an increase (decrease) in their contribution to the ACU. This will ensure that the ACU captures
the relative changes in economic activity and performance in the region in an effective and
dynamic manner.
V.2. Monetary and Exchange Rate Cooperation
A move towards an ACU would necessitate significant monetary and exchange rate
cooperation among the participating countries. Given the differences in the exchange rate
policies and inflation rates among these countries, a system as tight as the ERM will not be
feasible. Several other alternative proposals have been mentioned, each of which has it»s merits
and demerits.
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Williamson (1999) proposed that the Asian economies can adopt a common currency
peg vis-´a-vis the U.S. Dollar, Euro and Japanese Yen. This would stabilize exchange rates both
internally as well as vis-´a-vis other major trading partners, Euro Area and the U.S. Under this
arrangement the member currencies have a common set of weights based on the regional
trade shares. The members announce a central parity vis-´a-vis the basket and pledge to keep
the central parity within a unilaterally chosen band. The central parity and the band is allowed
to crawl in response to changes in the fundamental. In response to massive speculative attacks
countries are allowed to temporarily suspend the peg with a credible pledge to return as soon
as possible.
The biggest advantage of this arrangement is that it allows coexistence of the various
exchange rate regimes prevailing in the region like managed float in India, Thailand and
Singapore, independent float in Korea and the peg in China. Furthermore, while there is less
need for policy coordination and surveillance under this arrangement due to a unilaterally
chosen parity and band, the arrangement itself acts as a catalyst for greater convergence and
exchange rate stability, which is needed for a future move towards a common currency as
pointed out by Kawai and Takagi (2003). However, a major problem in this arrangement is the
adoption of common regional weights against the target currencies. If some participating
country»s trade share (weights) vis-´a-vis the target countries is very different from the region as
a whole then a change in the bilateral exchange rates of the target currencies will have a
skewed impact on these countries and they will experience a loss of export competitiveness.
Another alternative arrangement suggested by Oh and Harvie (2001) analyzes the potential
of replicating the EMS»s Exchange Rate Mechanism in the Asian region, with notable differences.
Under this arrangement, an Asian Currency Unit similar to the one developed will be put in
place. The member countries» exchange rate will float within a ± 15% band of the central
parity determined by an authority. Such an arrangement comes with several benefits. It will
significantly reduce interregional volatility of the nominal exchange rate as well as real effective
exchange rate (REER) resulting from intraregional parity changes and a greater degree of
comovement of the intraregional exchange rates. It will also induce faster economic and monetary
integration in the region. However, since the target is a basket of member country currencies,
realignments between major currencies outside the basket will not be reflected in the bilateral
exchange rates. On the other hand if the U.S. Dollar depreciates against the Euro but not the
Japanese Yen then exports from countries pegged to the U.S. Dollar will become more
competitive in Euro land compared to these Asian economies. Similarly, if the Japanese Yen
appreciates by 10% against the U.S. Dollar and Japan has 50% weight in the ACU, then other
members of the ACU will witness a 5% appreciation, which may reduce their competitiveness
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vis-´a-vis other dollar bloc countries.
Dornbusch and Park (1999) floated the idea of monetary cooperation among Asian
economies with the Japanese Yen as the anchor currency, a role performed by the German
Deutsche Mark under the ERM. However, given that the Japanese economy has not been in
very robust health in recent years it might be difficult to push for this proposal. Moreover such
an arrangement will entail a loss of competitiveness of Asian exports vis-´a-vis other dollar blocs
like MERCOSUR and NAFTA if Japanese Yen appreciates against the U.S. Dollar.
V.3. Establising A Centre Country
One of the commonly cited reasons for the successful monetary integration in Europe is
the central role played by Germany. It is widely believed that the presence of a strong currency,
Deutsche Mark, which acted as a nominal anchor in the EMS, facilitated the integration. Moreover
the Deutsche Mark was backed by the strong Bundesbank - which focused on price stability and
created an independent monetary policy committee - features that have become trademarks of
modern central banks. While in hindsight the role played by Germany seems to be pivotal for
European integration, at that time such a role was not planned and, when it existed, was studiously
underplayed. Formally, the EMS was a set of bilateral exchange rate arrangements with no
central currency. Economically strong and weak countries were subject to identical obligations
and interventionist rules. The emergence of the Deutsche Mark as the nominal anchor took
several years and was facilitated by irresponsible monetary management by other large economies
in the region, which led to speculative attacks on their currencies and sapped their positions.
In the Asian context, while it is true that some form of country leadership is desirable,
such leadership should not be seen as intimidating and must be counter balanced. In doing so,
political and historical sensitivities, as well as current power configurations must be kept in
mind. While Japan continues be a major player in the region, China and India have begun
mounting serious challenges to Japan»s hegemony. Hence a cohesive move towards greater
Asian integration must take shape around these few leading countries. The absence of a single
centre of influence will ensure that the leadership is balanced
V.4. Strengthening the Chiang Mai Initiative and the Asian Bond Fund
At the ASEAN+3 Finance Minister»s meeting held in Istanbul during May 2005 it was decided
by the participating countries to make several changes in the existing CMI structure. Apart from
agreeing to integrate economic surveillance into the CMI to develop an effective regional
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surveillance, the member countries also agreed to adopt a collective decision making mechanism
as a first step towards multilateralization. It was also decided to expand the size of the bilateral
agreements and increase the amount a country can draw without having an IMF program.
While the amount that a country can draw without being subject to an IMF program has
been increased from 10% to 20%, not much progress has been made on the other issues. The
combined size of the network of BSAs has increased from $36.5 billion in April 2004 to $83
billion in July 2007. Strong measures need to be undertaken to further increase the size of this
arrangement. One possible way is to invite new members like India, which has almost $300
billion as reserves, into the arrangement. Moreover, almost all the bilateral swaps are negotiated
between China, Japan, Korea and the original ASEAN countries. The smaller ASEAN members
like Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam are covered only by the ASEAN Swap
Agreement, which has a corpus of a measly $2 billion.
Similarly the Asian Bond Fund also needs to be increased from it»s current size and coverage.
Newer countries like India as well as other ASEAN economies can be invited to join the fund.
There is a serious need to amplify the corpus of funds available with the ABF for it to play a
deciding role in deepening capital market integration in the region. Thus the central banks of
the participating countries need to commit greater resources to the Fund. In it»s current form
the ABF is managed by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) an association of global
central banks. Thus the business of investing these funds is primarily in the hands of central
bankers who tend to be more conservative and willing to sacrifice return for liquidity. To ensure
greater development of international capital markets in the region, participation of the private
sector in the form of investment bankers and institutional investors in the ABF needs to be
encouraged.
V.5. Asian Monetary Cooperation Fund
Apart from strengthening the Chiang Mai Initiative and the Asian Bond Fund, the Asian
countries could create a regional fund denominated in the ACU. Such a fund could be used to
facilitate interventions in the currency markets, effect liquidations between the central banks
and manage short-term credit facilities associated with exchange rate cooperation. This fund
could be created by tapping the enormous amount of foreign reserves of East and South Asian
countries. Each member country could contribute a certain percentage of their foreign reserves
into the fund. Given that the total reserve holdings of the economies considered is in excess to
$3 trillion, even if these countries contribute 10% of their reserve holdings, a fund with over
$300 billion will be created.
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If the exchange rate of a participating currency falls too far, the Asian Monetary
Cooperation Fund (AMCF) could buy quantities of the currency on the foreign exchange market,
and if it rises too far, AMCF could sell enough of the currency to bring down the exchange rate.
Alternatively, the AMCF could also issue a parallel currency, Asian Currency Unit, which would
be a weighted composition of member countries» currency. ACU denominated bonds can be
encouraged and a regional clearing and payment mechanism can be established for ACU
transactions. Over time the AMCF can be converted to Asian Central Bank and assume the role
of conducting monetary policy in East and South Asia.
The corpus available could be used to fund several developmental needs of the region.
Primary among these uses could be financing infrastructural investment. Many countries of the
region like India, Vietnam, Indonesia etc. are facing massive infrastructure deficits, especially in
physical infrastructures like highways, power, airports etc. The AMCF could allocate funds,
denominated in ACU, for such projects. This would not only help mitigate the massive
infrastructure deficit in the region but also promote the public and the private sector use of
ACU. Other developmental needs that could be funded by the AMCF include social infrastructure
like health and education, environmental protection and strengthening of the financial sector,
among others.
V.6. Implementing an Effective Regional Surveillance System
One of the biggest challenges facing the ACU is the implementation of an effective
regional surveillance mechanism. The existing ASEAN+3 surveillance mechanism needs to be
significantly strengthened if it is to act as a meaningful instrument for greater economic and
monetary cooperation. According to Kenen and Meade (2008) and Girardin (2004) the Asian
economies need to move away from the principle of «non-intervention in other countries» affairs»
and actively provide their opinion on the policies followed in member countries. While a
confrontational approach involving direct criticism of the neighbouring countries» policies might
not be feasible at this stage, several other, less confrontational, measures can be undertaken.
Kenen and Meade (2008) and Grenville (2004) suggest a mechanism where the analysis and
the recommendations of an independent surveillance team is put before the member country
and the government is allowed to respond to the submissions. A healthy debate on major
macroeconomic and financial sector issues impacting the reporting country is a must for better
surveillance and greater coordination. This underlines the need for greater constructive criticism
among the member countries even if it comes at the expense of occasionally overlooking the
Asian tradition of not interfering in neighbours» affairs.
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V.7. Greater Integration of Goods and Services Market
Monetary cooperation in Europe was achieved with the goal of turning Europe into a
truly unified market. The 1957 Treaty of Rome founding EU had established a customs union
and barriers to goods and services trade were significantly reduced over the next four decades.
Thus trade cooperation began long before financial cooperation. On the other hand, in East
Asia financial cooperation took lead mainly as a response to the financial crisis of 1997. Such
financial cooperation now needs to be complemented with greater trade cooperation in the
region. With the likelihood of progress in implementing the Doha Development Agenda
appearing highly limited, countries in the region need to enhance trade cooperation through
bilateral agreements, rather than relying on multilateral trade talks. It can be clearly seen that
while some countries like Japan have been vigorously pursuing bilateral trade agreements,
other countries like Philippines and Indonesia are lagging behind.
Preferential or free trade agreements are likely to induce greater cooperation as they are
more flexible, wider and relatively easily achievable . Greater market integration through PTA/
FTAs will not only provide larger market access across the region but will also impart efficiency
through competition. In several cases trade agreements can be used as a strategy for pushing
domestic reforms. The foundation for Asian economic agreement lies in increasing common
economic interests based on economic interdependence. The ≈flying geese model∆ helped to
build a vertical chain across the region by encouraging capital mobility and technology transfer,
thereby formulating a high degree of intra-regional exchange. Such economic interdependence
can be further exploited through more free/preferential trade agreements among the region.
With greater intra-Asia trade integration, business cycles will be more correlated across countries
and it will be easier for the latter to engage in exchange rate cooperation, which is crucial for
moving towards an Asian Currency Unit.
VI. CONCLUSION
The formation of the economic integration, like any regional economic arrangement,
serves largely to help foster stability across the region. The formation of economic integration
can be further strengthened by the idea of a single currency. The feasibility of economic integration
and single currency is the main focus of this study. We investigated whether there is room for
OCA variables in explaining ERV in the case of ASEAN-5+3 for the period of 1970 to 2008.
The results provide some evidences that the ASEAN5+3 are considered not really ready to
form OCA. It corroborates the existing opinion that the different in economic structure and its
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policies over foreign environment are becoming some barriers and challenging area to
synchronize in the following time.
The positive impacts AS to ERV which are incurred in ASEAN5+3 economies indicate the
existence of inappropriate condition to form OCA since there are no similar shocks across a
monetary union»s participating countries. Under such condition, it would foster the costs of
forgoing the exchange rate as a shock absorbing mechanism.
It deserves to argue that those observed countries still are resisting their existing regime
since they are till believing that they begin to establish the system of monetary which are able
to absorb any possible shocks in regards of their SIZE. In sum, the ASEAN5+3 countries are
considered to fulfilling the requirement to form currency optimum area which are able to main
their stable currency.
According to Granger test, we found that only Thailand, Taiwan, Japan, and China which
are delivering the short run effects to observed variables. While the short-run impacts of ERV
on GDP and AS are positive for those following countries. Meanwhile in the case of Thailand,
GDP has caused over the existence to AS. It constitutes the fact that the Thailand economy
would be suffered a shock through the fluctuation in it»s GDP. Subsequently, Indonesia, Malaysia,
and Phillipinnes seem not to show any causal relationship between variables OCA and ERV.
A successful move towards an OCA basically need to overcome a number of obstacles
that are usually associated with greater economic and monetary integration, namely weak
institution, Inadequate Surveillance in the Region, Underdeveloped Bond Market, Diverse
Exchange Rate Regimes, Economic, Historical and Political Heterogeneity.
A successful move towards an Asian Currency Unit needs to overcome the above obstacles,
such as Periodic Review of the ACU, Monetary and Exchange Rate Cooperation, Establising A
Centre Country, Strengthening the Chiang Mai Initiative and the Asian Bond Fund, Asian
Monetary Cooperation Fund, Implementing an Effective Regional Surveillance System, Greater
Integration of Goods and Services market.
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